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ABATEMENT.

Divorce Suit-Death of one Party- W1hen the Suit rnay survive.,
When the party seeking a divorce appeals from a judgment simply denying it, and pending the appeal either party dies, the appeal and the
action abate absolutely, and cannot be revived, there being no one living
who can legally have any interest in the case : Downer, Adminstrator,
v. Howard, 44 Wis.
Upon the death of either party pending an appeal from a judgment
granting a divorce, or from a judgment determining either way an issue
as to the validity of a marriage, this court would probably permit the
appeal to be revived for the purpose of protecting persons (if any) whose
property interests were affected by the judgment: Id.
In a suit between husband and wife, on the death of the wife, without issue, pending the husband's appeal from a judgment awarding her
costs or suit money, there is a presumption that her administrator has
an interest (in behalf of her creditors) in the judgment and the appeal,
and has a right to have the appeal continued in his name: 17.
In an action by a wife for divorce, the husband's answer, besides denying the charges of the complMnt, alleged facts to show that the parties
were never lawfully married, and also alleged counter charges and demanded judgment of divorce against the wife. The court below dismissed the complaint and the husband's counter-claims, and adjudged
that defendant pay the wife's attorneys a certain sum to enable her to
pay expenses of her attorneys and counsel in carrying on the action.
Pending the husband's appeal from so much of the judgment as denied
his counter-claims, and awarded the wife suit money, the wife died and
an administrator was appointed, and was substituted as respondent in the
appeal. It did not appear, from the pleadings or -otherwise, that the
refusal to adjudge the marriage null would affect th6 -property or other
rights of any person. Beld, that the appeal abated by the death of the
wife, so far as it related to the dismissal of the husband's counterclaims; but might be continued in the name of the administrator so
far as it related to the award of suit money: Id.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

See Pleading.

From opinions delivered at the January Term 1878.

ThQ cases "will proba-

bly he reported in 37 or 38 Michigan Reports.

2 From
3 From
From
From

T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 66 Missouri Reports.
G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 11 of his Reports.
E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 31 Ohio St. Reports.
lion. 0. Al. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 44 Wisconsin Reports.
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. AcTIoN.

See Ptiblic Schools.

rditor- Conmposition Deed-Subseuent Promise to Pay
-loluntarI
P,wmet.-Where a debtor, after being discharged from
the obligation of his debts by a deed of composition with his creditors,
volunt:rily gives a security for a debt from which he is discharged by
such composition, and which is only due in conscience, such security may
be enforced in a court of law: (rossley v. Moore, 11 Vroom.
But any agreement with one creditor for an advantage to him-over
other creditors, made to induce him to join in the composition, or required by him as a condition upon which he shall become a party to it,
which is not provided for in thc composition deed, and is not disclosed
to the other creditors, is utterly void, and is incapable of being enforced
or confirmed even as against the assenting debtor. A security given in
pursuance of such a bargain or a subsequent promise of payment, is
equally void with the antecedent agreement; and money paid by the
debtor under such an agreement, in excess of the due proportion of such
creditor's debt, nmy be recovered back, unless if be paid under such
circumstances as to be regarded in law as a voluntary payment: Id.
Under what circumstances a payment of money in pursuance of such
a bargain will be an involuntary payment, and the properformn of action
by the debtor to recover back the money so paid, considered : Id,
Deltor and

AGENT.

Variance-A uthorily to draw Draft-Evdece of similar previous
Action -Ratlfication.-Whcre a draft purported to be drawn in the
name of the firm by D. . Brock as their agent, and on the trial it
appeared to have been drawn by D. IV. Brock : Held, that the-variance
was immaterial: McDonough et al. v. .Heyiman, S. 0. Mich., January
Term 1878.
Where an agent's authority to bind defendants by a draft is in question, it is proper, in connection with proof of his having previously
drawn a similar draft to the same order, which had been paid, to ask the
payee what the agent said to him at the time the first draft was drawn
as to his authority to draw in defendants' names. This is admissible
to show that in drawing both drafts the agent acted in the same capacity:
Id.
If parties in whose names a draft is drawn atpropriate and enjoy the
fruits of the same, with full knowledge of the transaction, they thereby
adopt and ratify the act of the person drawing it though previously
unauthorized: Md.
Knowledge not Motice to Prncipal.-Itseems that if the agent of an
express company receives goods consigned to him as such for delivery
to the purchaser, and having in his hands for collection at the same time
a bill for the price of such goods delivers them to the purchaser, the
company becomes liable to the consignor, whether the agent in fact collects the bill or not: Wells v. Tie American E.xpress Co., 44 Wis.
Where goods are not delivered to an eipress company, but are sent by
railway to their place of destination, consigned to the purchaser in the
care of the express company's agent at that place, and never come into
his possession, but are delivered by the railway company directly f4) the
purchaser, without fault of the express company or its agent, and a bill
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of such goods, sent also to such agent for collection, not being paid ny
the purchaser, is promptly returned by the agent, no liability of the express company to the consignor is created by these facts : Id.
0. having au order for goods, borrowed money of W. to enable him to
fill the order, and, upon shipping the goods, both C. & W. requested
the purchaser to send the purchase-money to W.; but he sent it by
express in a package addressed to C. and W. jointly. Eeld,that although
there was no such firm as C. & W., notice or delivery to either of them
was notice or delivery to both : Id.
A common carrier is not bound by its agent's knowledge or notice of
facts outside of his duties and employment as such agent: Id.
The mere fact, known to the express company's agent at the office of
delivery of the above-mentioned package, that W. had shipped goods to
the sender of the package, and had sent to the proper agent of such
company a bill of the goods for collection from him, which had been
returned unpaid, would not render the express company liable to 11.
for the value of the package, or of W.'s interest therein, after its
delivery to 0.: Id.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.
Assent to Award.-The parties to a promissory note-differing as to
the amount remaining due upon itreferred their difference to arbitrators, who fixed the amount and informed the parties. The holder thereupon surrendered the note to the maker, who accepted it; Held, that he
thereby assented to the award, and became bound to pay the amount
fixed by the arbitrators, although they may not have proceeded regularly
in ascertaining it: Phillips v. (Joch, 66 Mo.
BANKRUPTCY.
Dischargenot impeachablein State Court.-A discharge in bankruptcy
duly granted under the Act of March 2d 1867, when pleaded in bar to
an action for prior indebtedness, cannot be impeached in a state court,
notwithstanding the bankrupt purposely omitted the indebtedness sued
upon from the schedules, and purposely omitted giving the creditor
notice of the pendency of the proceedings: Brown, Executor, v. .Kroh,
Executor, 31 Ohio St.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Unendorsed Note 'payable to order- erbal Assignment.-A party
recover in his own name on an unendorsed note payable to order,
by showing a verbal assignment from the payee to himself; Robinson
v. Wilkinson, S. C. Mich., January Term 1878.
Note given for discontinuance of Criminal Prosecution.-A note is
equally void, whether given as partial or exclusive consideration for
the discontinuance by the prosecuting attorney of criminal proceedings:
Wisner v. Bordwell et al., S. C. Mich., January Term 1878.
Check-Delay in presenting.-Delayto present a bank check until the
failure of the bank, ten days after its receipt, held negligence which
would have discharged the drawers if they had left funds in the bank
until that time to meet the check: Kinyon. v. Stanton, 44 Wis.
But where the drawers drew out their entire account in the bank

-cannot

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

before its failure, they are liable to protect the check ; and this, though
the bank would probably have paid it at any time before the day of the
failure, and although its assignee (under the Federal Bankruptcy Act5
recovered from the drawers the money drawa out by them on that day:
Id.
BROKER.

Earning Commissions-Finding Purchaser.-Where a broker, employed to sell property at a price satisfactory to his principal, produces
a party ready to make the purchase at a satisfactory price, or to make
an exchange satisfactory to the principal, the latter cannot relieve himself from liability to the broker for a commission .y a capricious refusal
to consummate the sale : Delaplainev. Turnley, 44 Wis.
CHECK.

See Bills and Notes; Gift.

COHIMON CARRIER. See Agent.
Railroad-SpecialContract to carry Horses-Ne glince.-A railroad
company may, by express contract, limit its liability in the carriage of
horses : Morrison v. The Phillips Colby Construction Co., 44 Wis.
Possession by a shipper of a carrier's receipt for the property, containing special terms, is at leastprima facie evidence of his assent to
them, and in most cases may be conclusive: 1d.
Defendant's custom was to carry horses at the owner's risk, and at
reduced rates fbr that reason ; and the letters "0. R.," signifying
"Owner's Risk," were upon the receipt given plaintiff for his horses,
and retained'and put in evidence by him ; and he testifies that he "did
not see" those letters, but not that he did not understand their meaning.
Held, that the restricted liability of the company clearly appears from
plaintiff's evidence: Id.
The injury was caused by the breaking of a wheel under a freight car
in the train, which threw the car containing plaintiff's horses from the
track. The track was in good order, the wheel had been used for only
a short time, and, upon inspection after the accident, showed no flaw or
defect; and there was no evidence, except the mere fact of its breaking,
which tended to show negligence of the company. Held, that there was
no error in directing a verdict for the defendant: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAv.

See Municipal Corporation.

Taking Private Propertyfor Public Use.-When the ratification of an
assessment of damages of the landowner vests in the city a right, at its
will, to enter upon the land and possess it as a street, such a right constitutes a taking, within the sense of the constitutional provision forbidding the taking of private property for public use without compensation:
Fink v. Mayor and Common Council of Arewark, "11 Vroom.
When land is so taken, provision must be made for the payment of
such damages within a reasonable time: Id.
Interest will be allowed on the damages from the time the right of
action accrues; but if during this interim the landowner has used beneficially the land condemned, the value of such use will be taken into
the account: Id.
Putting twice in Jeopardy.-An award of punitive damages for a
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tort wliich is also punishable as a crime, is not in violation of the constitutional provision that no person for the same offence shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment; and the rule allowing such damages
should not now be abrogated or modified
in this state, except by legis44 Wis.
lation : Brown v. Swineford,
Provocation of an assault, though not sufficient for justification, may
go to exclude exemplary damages : Id.
See Bills and otes.
Assignment-Pleading-Averment of Breach.-A contract whereby
certain parties agree to deliver all the lumber they have, or may buy
during the season, to two persons, is assignable by one of the latter to
his associate : Hart v. Summers et al., S. (:Mich., January Term 1878.
An averment of a sale of any lumber to third parties is an averment
of a breach, and as no payment could be demanded without delivery or
readiness to deliver, there was no need to set forth the precise terms of
payment by usage, an averment of readiness at all times to comply with
the contract being sufficient : Rd.
On such a contract a special count lies for selling lumber not so far
set apart as to pass title to plaintiff, and also for such as had already been
passed, while the common counts lie for the latter: Id.
For PersonalServices-Assignment of.-An executory contract forpersonal services, to be paid for as performed, cannot be assigned by the
employer, unless the employee assents to the substitution of the assignee
as employer: Chupin v. Longworth, 31 Ohio St.
In an action by the employee against the employer and his assignee,
the allegation that subsequent to the agreement of the employer to assign
the employee rendered the same service for the assignee during'part of
the time embraced by the contract, and received compensation from him
at the rate therein specified, does not show such substitution: Id.
CONTRACT.

CORPORATION.

Personal Liability,of Stockholders-Foreign Statute.-The personal
liability of the officers and stockholders of a corporation for a debt contracted by the corporation is inconsistent with the idea of a body corporate at common law, and can arise only out of some statutory provision:
Salt Lake City lVational Bank v. Hendrickson, 11 Vroom.
In pleading a foreign statute, it must be set forth in substance, so that
the court niay see that the right or liability which depends on a statutory
enactment arises by force of such statutory provision. The averment,
" pursuant to the statute," without setting forth the substance of the
statute, is insufficient 4 Id.
Suit against Foreign- Contract made within the Statei-A foreign
corporation is liable to be sued in this state, on a contract made in this
state, when summoned in accordance with our laws: National Condensea
Milk Co. v. Brandenburgh, 11 Vroom.
If the contract sued on was made in this state, the court will not, upon
a motion to set aside the service of a summons, or to vacate a judgment
by default, for want of jurisdiction, inquire whether, in truth, the contract was made by the corporation. Such an inquiry must be reserved
for the trial of the cause : Id.
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It may be proper ground for letting in a foreign corporation to plead,
after judgment by default, because an honest defence was not interposed
through the advice of foreign counsel, bonafide followed by the corporate
officers: .d.
Created by two States.-A corporation created by concurrent legislation of two states, receiving from each the same charter in legal effect,
has a legal domicile in each state, and may lawfully hold its meetings
and transact its corporate business in either state : Bridge Co. v. Mfager,
31 Ohio St.
The case of Sebastian v. The Covington and Cincinnati Bridge Co.,
21 Ohio St. 451, is reviewed, and the principles therein established
approved Id.
Keeping its Records in the State- Forfeiture of Charter at suit of
State.-Independently of statutes, it is the duty of a private corporation
to keep its principal place of business, its records and the residence of
its officers so located as to render it accessible to the process and to the
exercise of the visitorial power of the state by which it is created; and
a forfeiture may be adjudged for violation of this common-law obligation: State ex rel. Attorney -General v. .Milwaukee, Lake Shore and
Western Railway a., 44 Wis.
An information showing that the principal office of the defendant company is in the city of New York; that its books and records have always
been kept in that city; that none of its principal officers regide in this
state; and that by reason of these facts it has been impossible to enforce
an attachment against the shares of.stockholders in said company in
actions brought in courts of this state, in accordance with the laws thereof, Reld, on demurrer, to show sufficient ground for adjudging a forfeiture of the company's charter: Id.
DAMAGES.

See ConstitutionalLaw; Libel.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Action; Partnership.

Contract-Appropriationof Fund-Process of Garnishment.-Process of garnishment cannot- be made to operate so as to annul the contracts of parties, or to subject a party to recovery by the creditor of his
creditor, when the latter could not himself recover: McPherson et al.
v. Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Co., Garnishee, 66 Mo.
Where by the terms of a lease the lessee was entitled, from time to
time, to deduct from the rental all taxes imposed upon the leased property, which the lessee either had paid or might be liable to pay, and
there was at the time no'law imposing a personal liability for taxes on
any one, but any taxes levied upon the property were a lien upon it:
Held. that the stipulation amounted to an appropriation of a reserved
fund out of the rental to the payment of the taxes: 1d.
DIVORCE.

See Abatenezt.

E MINENT DOMAIN.
ESTOIPEL.

See Way.

See Former Adjudication ; Pleading.
EVIDENCE.

See Partnership.
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FOREIGN STATUTE.

See Corporation

FORMER APJUDICATION.

-

Estoppel by Judgment.-Where an action was prosecuted to set aside
a contract on the ground of fraud, anal to cancel an unmatured note
given in pursuance of the contract, which resulted in a judgment affirming the validity of the contract and note: Held, that in a subs3quent
action on the note, the defendant is estopped, by the judgihent in the
fdrmer action, from setting up that the contract and note were executed
by the parties under a mutual mistake: Bell v. McCullough's Ex., 31
Ohio St.
FRANCHISE.

See Riparian Rights.

FRAUDS,

STATUTE OF.

Verbal Contractfor the Purchase of Land- When Money or ProVerty paid thereon cannot be recovered.-No action can be maintained to
recover back money or property, which has been paid upon a verbal
contract for the purchase of land, if the vendor is willing to execute

the contract on his part: Galway et al. v. Shields, 66 Mo.
In an action for the value of goods sold and delivered, no recovery
can be had, if it appears that such goods were delivered pursuant to a
verbal ageement that the price therefor was to be paid in specific land
to be conveyed by the buyer to the seller, and the buyer has offered and
is ready and willing to comply with his part of the agreement: Id.
GIFT.

Check-Death of Drawer before Payment.-The drawer of a check
delivered it to the payee, intending thereby to give to the payee the
fund on which the check was drawn. Held, that until the check was
either paid or accepted, the gift was incomplete; and that in the absence
of such payment or acceptance, the death of the drawer operated, as
against the payee, as a revocation of the check : Simmons v. Cincinnati
Savings Society, 31 Ohio St.
HIGHWAY.

Occupation by_Railroad.-Powergiven by a charter of a railroad company to construct its road across a public highway upon condition that
the same be restored to its former state, "or in a sufficient manner not
to impair its usefulness," does not authorize the company permanently to
appropriate any portion of the public highway by obstrfictions which
materially interfere with the public travel: Little Miami Railroad v.
Commissioners of Greene Co., 31 Ohio St.
The obligation, in such case, to restore the public highway to such
condition as not to.impair its usefulness, is a condition inseparable from
the company's right to construct its road across such highway, and the
Statute of Limitations is not an available defence to an action brought
to secure the performance of such condition: Id.
INSURANCE.

Change of T'tle to Property Insured- ortage.-It was stipulated,
in a policy of fire insurance, that if the property insured should be sold
or transferred, or any change made in its title, without the assent of the
VOL. XXVI..-85
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company insuring, the policy should be void. The assured sold and
conveyed the property for an agreed sum, to be paid in the future, the
company asseuting to the sale, but'without knowledge of its terms. To
secure the payment of the purchase price, the purchaser, atthe time of
the sale, and as a part of its teruis, executed a mortgage of the -property
to the vendor, of which the company had no knowledge until'after the
property was destroyed by fire. Held, that the assent given by the company to'said-sale and transfer of title was An assent to the terms upon
which the same was made, and hence that the execution of said mortgage did not avoid the policy : Fdriners' Is. Go. v. Ashton, 31 Ohio St.
JUDGMENT.

Cancellation by Fraud and .Mistake.-Where judgments assigned are
cancelled by fraud and mistake,caused by defendants' misrepresentations
to the plaiitiff's attorney, the cancellation will be vacated': Keogh v.
.Delany, 11 Vroom.
Merger-Attachmelit.-A note is not merged in a judgment rendered
thereon in an action commenced by. attachment where,, though property
was levied on, defendant was not personally served, and did not appear,
and where no part-of the judgment has been satisfied Smith v. Curtiss
.
S. C. Mich., January Term- 1878.
LANDLORD AND TE.NANT.

See Debtor and Creditor.

Liabldstj of Tenant for Rent after Assignment of the Term.-A lessor
may maintain an action for rent against his lessee, on an express covenant to pay'rent during the term,' contained in'a lease for ninety-nine
years and renewable for ever .though the rent accrued after the lessee
-bad assigned all his interest in the leasehold estate and after''the lessor
'had acceptcd rent from the'assignee of the term Taylor v. DeBits, 31
Ohio St.

The ease of Worthington v. Hewes & McCann, 19 Ohio St. 66, explained and limited: Id.
LIBEL.

Offers of incompetent Testimony-Pivileged l'ublicatons-Negligence
aste in issuing
of Newspaper Proprietor-,Exemplary .Damages-Paper.-Inan action for libel, it is error to allow the plaintiff to offer
successively in evidence, articles published in -defendant's newspaper
,subsequent to the time of publication of the article complained of, when
articles of the same character, and offered for the same purpose, have
been ruled out: Scripps v. Reilly,, S. (. 'Mich.,. January Term 1878.
,The character of offers madein the presence of the jury may be such,
even although the offers were rejected bellow, as to require, on error, a
.reversal of the judgment, where the party making such rejected offers
obtains a verdict: 1..
All incompetent testimony should be excluded from the knowledge of
the jury: Id.
Semble, that the publication of charges contained in a bill of complaint is not privileged.. At any rate, if a fair statement of the charges
were privileged, the privilege would be gone on the publication of a
.sensational article, with- notes and comments) based in part upon the
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charge made in the bill, and plaintiff would be entitled to recover the
same damages as though no bill had ever been filed : Id.
The burden of proving carelessness or negligence on the part of a
newspaper proprietor in the selection or retention of his employees, is
upon the plaintiff: Id.
Where the act done is one which, from its very nature, must be
expected to result in mischief, or where there is malice, or wilful or
wanton misconduct, carelessness or negligence so great as to indicate a
reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, damages are allowed
for injury to the feelings of the plaintiff: Id.
Where the tort consists of some voluntary act, but no element of
malice, carelessness or gross neglect is shown to have existed, but that
the wrong was done in spite of, proper precaution, the damage to be
awarded on account of injured feelings will be reduced to such sum
as must inevitably have resulted from the wrong itself: Id.
So far as exemplary damages are concerned, the fact that an indictment may or may not be pending or threatened for the same wrong is
wholly immaterial, as they are allowed by way of remuneration for the
injury sustained : Id.
Want of proper precaution in the employment of agents or assistants,
or of proper care in the conduct of the paper, or'the retention of improper employees after ascertaining their incompetency, carelessness or
negligence, may be shown to increase the damages to wounded feelings;
but express malice in the employees would not be admissible for such
purpose, where the act was done without the knowledge or consent of
the defendant, where proper care had been exercised in their employment and retention : Nd.
The hurry incident in the issuing of a newspaper, and the .time in
connection therewith at which the article in question was received, are
admissible in evidence, and should be considered by the jury, not as an
excuse or justification, but as circumstances characterizing the act, and
to aid in fixing the amount of damages to be recovered : Id.
When it hecomes important to consider what degree of care and prudence has been exercised by the proprietor of a newspaper in the publication thereof, the character which the paper has earned may be shown,
irrespective of the truth or falsity of the articles, by the introduction
of the papers containing them, to aid the jury in determining the
question: Id.
Publlcation-Remote Damages.-In a complaint for libel, for words
not in themselves actionable, contained in a letter from defendant to one
C., where the specialdamages alleged appear to have resulted not from
the reading of the letter by C., but from the reading of it by others
to whom it shown by him, there being no averment that defendant authorized C. to show the letter to such other persons : RIeNl, that no cause
of action is stated, such special damages not being the natural and immediate consequence of the publication charged upon defendant: Gough
Y. Goldsmith, 44 Wis.
LIMITATIONS,

STATUTE OF.

credit upon an account after the cause of
Credit on Account.action on the same is barred by the Statute of Limitations, will not be
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.treated as part payment thereof, unless shown to have been so intended
by the parties : Kauzrnan, Adrn'r, v. Broughton, 31 Ohio St.
See Contract.
lnjury by .egligence of Superior Servant.-The master ks liable for
an injury to a servant resulting from the negligence of a superior servant, while the latter is discharging the duties of one under his c, ntrol
to the same extent as if the act causing the injury hd been committed
by an inferior servant under his directions: Berea IStone Co. v. Kraft,
31 Ohio St.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

MORTGAGE.

Sale under trust Deed, not affected by voluntary Absence of Trustor in
Confederate States-Notice of Foreclosure..--A sale under a deed of
trust given by a debtor to secure the payment of his debt, is not invalidated by the fact that at the time it was made he was residing within
the military lines of the confederate states, if he was a citizen of Missouri when the deed was executed, and his removal within the confederate line: took place after the debt matured and was voluntary : -Martin
v. P'axson, 66 Mo.
A stipulation in a deed of trust given to secure the payment of a
debt, that in the event of default in payment the trustee, may sell the
trust property, lying in Morgan county, at public sale, at the court house
door in Boonville, Cooper county, first giving at least thirty days' notice
of the time, terms and place of sale, and of the property to be sold, by
advertisement in Morgan or adjoining county, is not void for uncertainty
or as being against public policy. Such matters are proper subjects of
contract between the parties, and their contract is binding: -d.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

ConstitutionalPower of Legislature over- Courts to determine what is
General Legislation.-On application for a mandamus against the. common council, they may call in question the constitutionality of an act
which legislates them out of office : The State, ex ret. Pell, v. Mayor and
Common Council of Newark, 11 Vroom.
The words, "the legislature shall pass no special act conferring' corporate powers," in the constitution, applies only to private corporations,
and not to municipal corporations : Id.
The legislature may, by special laws, establish townships, cities and
counties, and change or alter their exterior lines at w,1 l : Id.
The internal affairs of cities, towns and
so : Id. must be reguldted
to docounties
by general laws, where it is practicable
The court, and not the legislature, is the tribunal which must determine whether an object can be accomplished by general legislation: Id.
The manner in which ward lines are run, being a matter which concerns only those within the city, affecting exclusively internal affairs, a
general law must be framed to chafige such ward lines, special legislation
being prohibited in such cases : Id.
Paving Contract- Unused Material- Conversion-Liabilityof City.Where the contractors, in a forfeited paving contract, have left loose
sand lying within the limits of the unfinished work, it is their duty to
remove it, and the city or new contractors perform no tortious act in
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removing it from the street :,City of Detroit v. Michigan Paving Co.,
S. 0. Mich., ,January Term 1878.
Nothing but a distinct sale could amount to,a conversionof the sand
by the city, anid use by new contractors under any other fboting than as
grantees by the city is an independent act of their own, for which the
city'is not re6.ponsible : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Common Carrier.
PARDON.

When e.reeutcd, ,ot r'evocable- Coistructive Deliv&ery.- A pardon or
commutation of sentence takes effect, and the recipient of executive
clemency cannot be deprived of its benefits and immunities by-a subsequent revocation, when it has been signed by the executive, properly
attested, authenticated by the seal of the state, and delivered either to
the recipient, or to some one acting for him,.or on his behalf: Exyarte
.Reno, 66 Mo.
Delivery of a pardon by the governor, to one suing P'or the release of
a prisoner confined in the state, penitentiary, i constructive delivery to
the prisoner: Id.
Under the constitution of 1865, the governor had power to grant a
conditional pardon, but the conditions, to' be,, operative, should appear
on the face of th6 paper : l.
PAIITNERSnIp.

Settement on D3sottion-Notes given to 'edeitors ,ysettZing Part-

ner.-Upon the dissolution of a firm; plaintiff received notes of one of
the former partners for a firm debt due him. There being conflicting
testimony upon the question whether thes were. taken in payment of
such debt, *ormerely as collaterals, the jury were at liberty to determine
the question from circumstantialas well as from direct and positive evidence of the fact;, and it'was error to instruct them that such an agreement' could not be "found in the affirmative by,iiiference, but must be
established by affirmative proof:"' Gates v. fluglhes, 44 Wis,
The amount df 'the firm property turned over to the maker of said
niotes upon the dissolution, and his ability to pay plaintiff's demand,
were proper facts to be considered' by tle jury, in connection with
others, in determining whether such-agreement was made : Id.
Where, after dissolution of the firm of A. and- B,, A. assumes, as
between himself and B., payment of a firm debt, and tbe 'creditor, with
knowledge of that arrangement, accepts .notes of A. postponing the
time of payment without the assent of B.: Quere, whether:B., is not to
be regarded as having been,a mere surety for the debt, and as released
by the taking of the notes :,d.
:PARTITION.'
Effect of Decree-Ejectment byl Parties noi bound.--Parties'holding
lands in severalty by virtue of purchases under,'allotments in partition
proceedings, cannot have the decree under which they elaim-and which
contained no defect so far as the parties to the petition suit were concerned-opened or avoided to prevent persons.not parties to that suit,
and who have done nothing to bar their rights, from asserting. their
interests by ejectuient f Walsh et al. v. Varney, S. C.3Iich,, January
Term 1878.
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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
PLEADING.

See Contract; Corporanon.

Departure-ArgumentativePleas-Demurrcr.-Thereplication must
support and fortify the declaration. The plaintiff. where an evasive plea
is filed, may re-state his cause with more particularity and certainty in
his replication, but he must not depart from any material allegation in
the declaration: Salt Lake Gity National Bank v. flendrickson, 11
*Vroom.
A departure in pleading is a fault in substance, and may be taken advantage of by general demurrer: Md.
An argumentative plea is good on general demurrer. An objection
of that kind could formerly be taken advantage of only by special demurrer, and is now available only by a motion to strike out: Id.
The rule that judgment on demurrer will be given against the party
whose pleading is first defective, applies only when the defect in the
prior pleading is in a matter of substance, such as would be available
on general demurrer: Id.
Accord and Satisfaction-Estoppe.-TUpon application of a landoWner whose dam had been taken down by the Essex Public Road
Board in constructing a highway, an alternative 2nandamns was allowed
directed to said board, commanding them to apply as directed by their
charter for the appointment of appraisers to assess the damages for said
taking, or show cause, &c. As a return to this writ, the board filed
three pleas. On motion to strike out, it is held1. That the first plea, that the said dam was taken down by the board
by leave and license of the relator, is bad.
2. That the second plea, that as compensation for the taking of said
dam, a new dam was erected by the board for the relator, and recepted
by him in full satisfaction of all claims, &c., is good as a plea of accord
and satisfaction.
3. That a plea setting up a former assessment for taking the same
property, and also an acceptance of the award so found as compensation, &c., is bad for duplicity. As a plea in estoppel, it should have
stated all jurisdictional facts directly and not legal conclusions. As a
plea of accord and satisfaction, it is argumentative : State ex rel. 11'heeler
v. Essex PublicRoad Board, 11 Yroom.
POSSESSION.

Writ of-Dutty of O.fficer-Characterof Possession he iust deliver.Under-a writ of possession, the officer must invest the plaintiff with the
full, actual and complete possession of the premises. lte is bound to
remove all persons in possession. The test is, that the plaintiff must
be so established in his possession by the officer, that any person entering upon him, se.invito, will be indictable for a forcible entry: 1lhabitants of Union, to use of Elliott, v. Bayliss, 11 Vroom.
The officer is not bound to remove the tenant's goods, but he may give
the tenant an opportunity to do so, or he may remove them himself, as
the agent of the plaintiff: Id.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

Power of School Directors to make Rules-Li,,biliy for enforcing
them.-The school law (Wag. Stat., p. 1264, § 8) provides that the
board of directors "shall have power to make and enforce all needful
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rules and regulations 1br the government, management and control of
such scholol and property as tivy shall think proper * * * not inconsistent with the laws of the land." A board of directors having made
a rule th.'at no pupil should, during the school term, attend a social party,
the plaintiff, a pupil of the school, by the permission ot his parents,
violated the rule, and was expelled from the school fbr so doing. In an
action ag ainst the directors to recover damages for the expulsion ; Held,
1. That under the law, they had the power to make needful rules for
government of pupils while at school, but no power to fbllow them hionm
and govern their conduct while under the parental eye ; that in prescribing the foregoing rule they had gone beyond their power, and had invaded the rights of' the parents. but 2. As there was-no malice, oppression or wilfulness on the part of the directors, they were not liable in
dam-tges: Dritt v. Snodqrass, 66 Mo.
In a case where malice is the gravamen of the action, the petition
will be held bad on demurrer, if the facts as detailed in it show that
there was no malice, notwithstanding it contains a general charge that
defendant's acts were wilful, malicious and oppressive: Id.
RAILROAD.

See Common Carrier.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

Franchise of Boo, in Navigable River- Trespass.-The grant of
a franchise (as to maintain a boom in a river, within certain limits) cannot license a trespas:s by the grantee on lands of other persons : Stevens'
Point Boom 0. v. Reilly, 44 Wis.
The purchaser of a trespasser's possession takes no right which the
trespasser had not: I1.
The franchise to maintain a boom in a navigable river within certain
limits does not pass by a mortgage, by the grantee of the franchise, of
land within those limits of which he had no title: Id.
Riparian owners on the hanks of streams in this state which are navigable for the purpose of floating logs to market, may lawfully, until
prohibited by statute, construct in front of their land proper booms to
aid in flotiin logs, so as not to violate any public law or obstruct the
navigation of the river by any method in which it may be used, or infringe upon the rights of other riparian owners: Id.
Riparian owners lawfully in possession of piers and booms upon a
navigable stream. may enjoin any obstruction of the .river below which
will interfere with the beneficial use of their property; but cannot
absolutely restrain lower riparian owners from maintaining booms in
front of their own land : Id.
SALE.

Requisites of CGotract-Pricemay be fixed subsequently- Waier.It is not necessary to the validity of a contract of sale, that it should
determine the price in the first instance; but it may appoint a way by
which it shall be thereafter determined, and in thaft case the contract
will be perfected when the price has been so determined : Cunningharm
v. Brown, 44 Wis.
Where, therefore, a contract for the sale of a village lot provided
that the price should be the same as the price of sale of the first lot
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which should be sold in the vicinity, and lots adjoining the one in question were sold before the action was commenced : Held, that the contract was thus rendered certain : Id.
Where, by the contrlact of sale, land was to be paid for in part by
labor and services, and upon the vendee's demand for an adjustment of
the amounts paid and unpaid, and a conveyance, the vendor repudiated
the contract and ordered him to quit the possession, tlis was a waiver
of any further tender or demand, before suit by the vendee for specific
performance : Id.
SCHooLs.

See Public Schools.

STATUTE.
have been or shall be, in the Act passed
shall
Retroaetive.-The words
April 9th 1875, to beal defects in public notices, are prospective, and
not retrospective. The intent to make statutes retroactive must clearly
appear by express words or by necessary implication : State, Alden,
pros., v. Newark, 11 Vroom.
See Partnership.

. SURETY.

TRESPASS.

See Riparian Rights.

See Mortgage.
Mortgagor-Power after making Deed.-One who gives a deed of
trust upon land cannot afterwards make any agreement concerning the
same to the prejudice of the title conveyed by the deed. A subsequent
contract with a stranger permitting him to enclose and use part of the
land, is void as against a purchaser at a sale under the deed of trust:
Sims v. ield, 66 Mo.
USURY.
When it may be shown.-If a new security includes sums for unpaid
usurious items, it is to that extent without consideration and liable to
abatement: Gardner v. Matteson, S. C. Mich., January Terhn 1878.
In replevin against the mortgagee of chattels who has seized them
for non-payment, the mortgagor may show that the notes secured by the
mortgage are in part made up of usurious items : Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
VOLUNTARY

See Frauds, Statute of; Sale.

PAYMENT,

WAIVER.

See Action.

See Sale.

WAY.
Road-Must be Necessary.-Only
Private
for
Land
of
Appropriation
a clear, practical necessity, not mere convenience, warrants the taking
of private property for a private road. It is only justifiable where no
other way of access to the applicant's land can be found: People ex rel.
Ayres et al.v. Richards, S. 0. Mich., January Term 1878.

